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Abstract
The European Employment Strategy (EES) aims to promote convergence of
domestic labour market policies by soft law instruments. Previous studies on
the impact of the EES are mainly focused on active labour market policies. The
present study aims at explaining cross national variation in national passive
labour market policies and unemployment benefit levels. Building on the most
recent measures and pooled time series data, the empirical findings reveal the
presence of a convergence process among the most advanced economies regard-
ing passive labour market policy efforts, with the EES fostering this trend even
further. Furthermore, our findings support the argument that the EES creates
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pressure varies across countries and over time. The results suggest that the rec-
ommendations from the European Council have contributed to unemployment
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1 Introduction
Both convergence and Europeanization are two of the most debated issues in com-
parative welfare state analysis. Welfare state policy convergence across countries can
be expected to result from confrontations with relatively similar economic, demo-
graphic and societal problem patterns. In the same vein, Europeanization is said to
foster convergence tendencies, exposing different political jurisdictions to the same
external pressure and ideas of political problem solving. In this paper, we address
and disentangle both issues in the context of passive labour market policies, an area
experiencing extensive policy reform efforts over the last decades. In the context
of labour market policies, the European Employment Strategy (EES) is an impor-
tant source of Europeanization. As an application of the Open Method of Coordina-
tion (OMC), the EES aims to promote convergence of labour market policies by soft
law mechanisms like emulation and policy diffusion. Previous studies are mainly
focused on the impact of the EES on domestic active labour market policies (Van
Vliet and Koster 2011, Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009, Armingeon 2007, Zeitlin and
Pochet 2005, Mosher and Trubek 2003). On the contrary, less research focused on
the impact of the EES on passive labour market policies like unemployment benefit
schemes. This is remarkable, because the EES does not only aim at higher employ-
ment and lower unemployment levels by promoting active labour market policies.
Another key message of the EES is that disincentives for labour market participation
stemming from passive policies should be reduced (Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx
2011, Cantillon 2011). Moreover, many authors point at the potential constraining
effect of promoting activation schemes on its programmatic counterpart, that are pas-
sive labour market measures (Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009, De la Porte 2007, Bu¨chs
2007, De la Porte and Pochet 2004). Put differently, the recalibration of labour market
policies as proposed by the EES is argued to induce shifts of resources from passive
to active measures and thereby exerts pressure on the generosity of passive schemes.
The existing literature on the relationship between the EES and domestic reforms of
passive labour market policies consists mainly of case study oriented research. For
instance, it has been described how the EES has contributed to the German Hartz
reforms (Bu¨chs 2007, Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008). In this paper, we examine
to what extent the evidence presented in the case studies can be generalized across
countries and over time.
In the comparative political economy literature on welfare states, the convergence
of passive labour market policies has been a subject of research for quite some time
(Schmitt and Starke 2011, Caminada et al. 2010, Montanari et al. 2008, Korpi and
Palme 2003, Cornelisse and Goudswaard 2002). Starting from the analyses of to-
tal public social expenditures at the aggregate level, many researchers progressed to
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analysing social expenditures at the program level. However, none of the existing
studies has explicitly been focused on the variation in expenditures on passive labour
market policies. This is remarkable given the importance of unemployment bene-
fit schemes in welfare states. Building on the approach proposed by Plu¨mper and
Schneider (2009), we aim to analyse the variation in passive labour market policy
expenditures across 22 countries using several measures. In addition, the study relies
on replacement rates as measure for the generosity of unemployment benefits.
To sum up, this paper seeks to make three contributions to the literature: First,
we aim to extent existing studies on EES’ impact on employment policies to the
realm of passive labour market policies. Second, we seek to complement the welfare
state literature by specifically focusing on passive labour market policy expenditures.
Hence, we aim to extract the influence of the EES on both the convergence of and
the variation in efforts devoted to PLMPs across countries and time. Third, relying
on new data, this study updates the existing research on labour market policy to 2009
and includes the first years of the credit crisis at the beginning of the 21st century.
2 Passive labour market policies, the European Employ-
ment Strategy and convergence processes
2.1 Passive labour market policies
PLMPs are policies which entitle labour market participants to benefits in the case
of unemployment. These passive measures encompass public support for income
maintenance. As such, unemployment benefit schemes allow unemployed people to
take the time to search for the best jobs. On the other hand passive measures can be
expected to discourage people from taking up work. Yet, in the empirical literature
it is fiercely debated which effect prevails (for a summary see Palme 2010). One
strand of research argues that relatively generous benefits might prolong the duration
of people staying in unemployment and thereby contribute to the burden of long-term
unemployment (Layard et al. 2005). Others stress the role unemployment benefits
play in preventing people from falling into poverty, point at positive effects from the
so-called entitlement effect or highlight the fact that longer job searches may result
in better matches on the labour market (Nickell et al. 2005, Belot and Van Ours
2004, Acemoglu and Shimer 1999). This is the background against which the policy
guidelines of the EES on reforming PLMPs were drafted.
2.2 Europeanization and soft law
Europeanization can be understood as the impact from various types of EU policies
on national policy-making processes (Radaelli 2003/b). In the case of PLMPs, the
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relevant vehicle to represent EU-level policy influence is the European Employment
Strategy. Launched in 1997, the EES’ main objective is to promote employability
and adaptability of the European workforce. In the EES, the catch-word is coordi-
nation, defining common policy goals which are intended to guide national labour
market policy-making. As an intergovernmental means of the EU, instruments of the
EES are non-binding but consist of recommendations, guidelines and benchmarks.
This makes the EES a multifaceted instrument, exerting different levels of influ-
ence on the member states. This characteristic makes the EES especially suitable
for cross-country longitudinal comparisons, wielding an influence which does vary
across countries and over time (Mosher and Trubek 2003).
The European Employment Strategy aims to promote active labour market poli-
cies while simultaneously emphasizing the perceived work disincentives of passive
measures (Zeitlin and Trubek 2003, Savfati and Bonoli 2002). The different guide-
lines as laid out in the EES are permeated with a set of policy norms arguing in favour
of a stronger focus on labour market participation (Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008).
Especially the first of the four pillars (Employability) of the EES contains guidelines
which endorse activation of the workforce. This paradigm of activation is frequently
said to have a constraining effect on passive labour market schemes (Heidenreich
and Zeitlin 2009, de la Porte 2007, Bu¨chs 2007, de la Porte and Pochet 2004). In
general, it is argued that when budget-constrained politicians reprioritize LMPs in
favour of activation, passive schemes are likely of bearing the brunt of this reprior-
itization (Swank 2011). In particular, the EES itself enforces the idea of reforming
PLMPs. It advocates the idea of ’make work pay’ and advises individual member
states to ”examine in more detail disincentives within the tax and benefit system
which may discourage labour-market participation of all groups [...]” (Council of the
EU 2000). Indeed, case study literature indicates that EES contributed to rearrange-
ments of LMPs on the expense of passive schemes (Van Gerven and Beckers 2009,
Preunkert and Zirra 2009, Bu¨chs 2007, Ballaster 2007). For instance Bu¨chs (2007)
points out that the Hartz IV act in Germany with its introduction of new means-tested
benefit regulation while simultaneously fostering activation schemes was presented
as the government’s strategy to implement EES guidelines. In the same vein, a re-
form tightening the eligibility length of unemployment benefits in Spain (2002) is
said to be accomplished partly under the influence of Council recommendations and
EES guidelines (Ballaster 2005). Yet, it is an empirical question to what extent these
country-specific factors and developments presented in the case-study literature can
be generalized across countries and over time. Hence, we test the hypothesis that the
EES has a negative effect on the generosity of passive labour market schemes.
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2.3 Convergence and the European Employment Strategy
As Plu¨mper and Schneider highlighted in their recent paper (2009), most conver-
gence studies fall short in theoretically grounding the specific convergence process
they expect. We aim to tackle this problem by specifying the underlying theoretical
mechanisms of EES-induced convergence of PLMPs.
First of all, following Knill (2005: 768), we understand policy convergence as
’any increase in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a certain pol-
icy across a given set of political jurisdictions over a given period of time’. What is
more, convergence induced by Europeanization requires that EU-level policy goals
are passed on to national policy arenas. In general, there are three main channels
through which EU-level policies might be transmitted into national policy-making
(Montanari 2008): Harmonization through directives and regulations, indirect con-
vergence via constraints on political decision-making and emulation by non-binding
policy recommendations and intergovernmental means of governance like the EES.
In the realm of labour market policies, emulation is a key driver of policy diffusion
and convergence (Zeitlin et al. 2005). The existing literature derives three main
effects on how the EES may shape domestic labour market policy reforms. First,
the policy goals and guidelines presented in the European Employment Strategy are
argued to have a normative influence on employment policy reforms of the partici-
pating countries (Jacobsson 2011). The performance of governments regarding these
policy goals exert peer pressure on one another and result in changes of domestic
policies. Being more precisely, the effectiveness of these goals relies on soft sanc-
tions in the form of ’naming and shaming’, assuming that no member state wants
to be seen as a violator of norms. Bu¨chs (2007) showed how parliamentary fac-
tions in the German Bundestag identified EES’ benchmarking process as a catalyst
of increased reform pressure on the national government. When more countries in
the EU are pressured to reform according to the same standards, labour market poli-
cies become more similar. Second, the EES might influence national policy-making
through the exchange of information and ideas leading to similar policy responses.
Through the EES, member states continuously participate in mutual learning activi-
ties like peer review and ’best practices’, resulting in cross-national policy diffusion
(Mosher and Trubek 2003, Radaelli 2003/a, Ferrera et al. 2001). In this process,
which can be conceptualized as mimicking and imitating, policy outcomes are ex-
pected to become more similar. For instance, an analysis of unemployment benefit
reforms in four countries by Van Gerven and Beckers (2009) showed a match be-
tween the objectives laid out by the EES and the implemented policy of reforms. All
four countries set their policy goals in line with EES recommendations, resulting in
a convergence of reform agendas. Finally, Visser (2009) describes policy learning
via the EES as a process of enforcing policy makers to change their attitudes from
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passive administering of unemployment towards new methods of activation which in
turn made EU Member States ’to move in the same direction, with different degrees
of intensity and varying success’ (Visser 2009). Third, the EES is sometimes strate-
gically used by national actors for external legitimization of certain labour market
policies. For instance, domestic governments are tempted to make use of the EES
to justify unpopular measures or reforms (Mailand 2008). During the Hartz IV leg-
islative procedure in Germany, the ruling government used various EES guidelines to
argue for out-of-favour measures like the increased pressure put on unemployed for
taking up jobs (Bu¨chs 2007). Hence, national actors became advocates of EES goals
and transmitted those into the national political arena.
In summary, the EES has been argued to play a significant role in promoting
convergence of labour market policies of the member states. Indeed, the European
Commission concluded in an assessment in 2002 that the EES ”started a process
of convergence between member states’ employment policies towards prevention of
long-term unemployment [...]” (European Commission 2002: 11-13). In order to
test this commission statement we hypothesize that participation in the EES fosters
convergence of passive labour market policies. From the lines of reasoning outlined
above, we derive two main hypotheses to test:
H1: The EES has a negative effect on the generosity of domestic passive labour
market policy schemes
H2: Convergence of passive labour market policy schemes should be stronger among
countries which participate in the EES than among other advanced industrialized
democracies.
The EES can be understood as a comprehensive instrument, exerting different levels
of pressure on the member states. In particular, the scope and exposure to country-
specific Council recommendations can differ quite significantly. When the Council
issues a recommendation, the Council notifies a government that it should made more
progress on a certain policy area. For instance, one of the recommendations that Ger-
many received regarding PLMPs states that Germany ’should examine in more detail
disincentives within the tax and benefit system which may discourage labour market
participation of all groups[...]’ (Council of the EU 2000). Some member states re-
ceived a fair amount of recommendations calling for reforms, whereas other countries
have not been subject of any of these advices (see Figure 1). It has been argued that
the sheer number of recommendations a state receives does create important pressure
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to domestic reform (Tucker 2003). Furthermore, Heidenreich and Bischoff (2008)
highlight that the number of recommendations does matter due to the fact that this
number represents the relative position of a country regarding the respective policy
field. Thus, we disaggregate the EES into single Council recommendations on PLMP
reforms and thereby test a third hypothesis:
H3: The number of Council recommendations received by a country is negatively
related to the generosity of domestic passive labour market policy schemes.
3 Data, measures and method
3.1 Dependent variable
An important issue of debate among welfare state scholars is the selection of indi-
cators that should be used to test for convergence of ’welfare efforts’ in general and
of labour market policies in particular. This is known as the ’dependent variable
problem’ (Clasen and Siegel, 2007). On the one hand, there are authors advocating
for aggregated measures like annual expenditure, highlighting the gains stemming
from the macro perspective of those data (Starke and Schmitt 2011, Castles 2002,
Swank 2002). On the other hand, researchers accuse aggregate measures of being too
broad and sometimes misleading. Their claim is that aggregated data are potentially
distorted by its denominator (GDP), the differences in tax treatments and cyclical
trends. They prefer indicators such as replacement rates instead (Montanari 2007,
Allan and Scruggs 2004, Korpi 2003). We aim to overcome that divide by applying
the same empirical approach on both indicators, i.e. on unemployment replacement
rates and on expenditures on unemployment benefits. The use of both measures pro-
vides a broad-based assessment of how Europeanization influences labour market
policy outcomes.
The dependent variable of this study displays ’PLMP effort’. For PLMP expen-
diture data, we use information from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (2012).
Expenditures on PLMPs consist mainly of expenditures on unemployment benefit
schemes. First, we use government spending on passive measures as a percentage
of the GDP. Second, we express PLMP expenditures relative to ALMP expenditures.
ALMP expenditures consist of expenditures on employment services, training, em-
ployment incentives, integration of the disabled, direct job creation and start-up in-
centives. Furthermore, we employ two measures for the generosity of PLMPs at the
individual level. First, PLMPs expenditures are measured per unemployed relative to
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GDP per capita, yielding a fine-tuned measure frequently used in cross-country com-
parisons on employment policies (Armingeon 2007, Scarpetta 1996). Second, we
include unemployment replacement rates. The net unemployment replacement rate
is the ratio of the net income from unemployment benefits to the net income from
work. The calculations assume a worker, aged 40, who earns the average production
worker wage.1 The measure indicates the generosity of unemployment benefits in the
initial phase of unemployment. Data are taken from the Unemployment Replacement
Rates Dataset (Van Vliet and Caminada 2012). In addition, also the duration of the
entitlement rights would be a relevant measure of the generosity of unemployment
benefits. However, this study does not include the duration because of the limited
data availability. Earlier research shows that the average duration of unemployment
benefits across OECD countries has decreased in the 1980s and the 1990s, but in
most countries the changes are relative small (Swank 2011, Van Vliet 2010). The
use of these four measures for PLMPs enables us to draw conclusions about both the
absolute magnitude of passive labour market policies and its relative size.
3.2 Convergence and Europeanization variables
To identify simple beta-convergence, we include the lagged level of the dependent
variable. Beyond that, our analysis focuses on Europeanization as a factor condition-
ing convergence in labour market policies. To assess whether and, if so, how Euro-
peanization matters, we include a variable capturing the effect of the EES. It consists
of a dummy variable scored 1 for EU countries participating in the EES from 1998
onwards. By using interaction terms revealing whether the EES exerts an impact
on the rate of convergence, we further detangle its conditional effect (Plu¨mper and
Schneider 2009). Furthermore, this strategy helps us to control for the proposition
that the observed convergence might be the mere result of similar challenges posed
to welfare regimes across all countries.
Subsequently, we disaggregate the EES and enter single Council recommenda-
tions on passive schemes as a variable to our analysis. Following Van Vliet and
Koster (2011) who constructed a measure for recommendations on ALMPs, our vari-
able measures the number of Council recommendations calling for PLMP reforms
received per country and per year. In the case of Council recommendations we rely
1The OECD has made a fundamental change in the approach of the average wages. The classical ap-
proach of calculating the average wage was based on the average wage of a production worker (APW),
which refers to the wage level in the manufacturing industry. The new concept for the average wage
refers to the average worker wage (AW), which includes much more sectors. The differences in the
levels of the APW and the AW can be significant for individual countries. The transition from APW to
AW started in 2005 and the AW is available from 2000 onwards. The APW data is available for all years
up to 2005 and for the year 2007. Hence, there is no consistent time series for the period 1985-2008.
In order to have a consistent replacement rate time series, Van Vliet and Caminada(2012) estimated the
APW for the years 2006 and 2008 based on the growth rate of the AW.
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on our own data gathered by screening Council documents from 2000 to 2004. Due
to the time-break of the EES in 2005, subsequent data concerning Council recom-
mendations is not used in this study. 2 All recommendations and the corresponding
country-specific challenges regarding benefit systems as named by the Council are
listed in Appendix B.
3.3 Control variables
The control variables used in our study are customary in the literature. First of all,
we include the unemployment rate measured as a percentage of civilian labour force
to our analysis. In the short run, since soaring levels of unemployment increase the
number of potential benefit recipients, PLMP spending is expected to rise. In the long
run however, high expenditures on unemployed benefits due to persistently high lev-
els of joblessness may lead to budgetary problems and hence, benefits will be made
less generous (Gaston and Rajaguru 2008, Saint-Paul 1996). Therefore, we expect
an immediate positive impact of unemployment on PLMP expenditure as well as a
negative constraining effect over time. Second, excessive government debt and bud-
getary crises are considered as a potential driving force for cutbacks in passive unem-
ployment schemes. Therefore, we include gross government debt as a percentage of
GDP to control for the consequences of indebtedness. Acknowledging theoretical ac-
counts of the efficiency and the compensation hypotheses and to capture the influence
of globalization on convergence, we control for the effects of economic openness of
a country (Jensen 2011, Rodrik 1998). We include two different measurements for
openness, one for external trade dependence and a second one to capture financial
interdependence. The first one is calculated from the sum of exports and imports
divided by GDP whereas the latter consists of the net inflows of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) as a percentage of GDP. In general, more economically developed coun-
tries provide more generous unemployment compensation schemes and have higher
spending on labour market policies. Therefore, we include the GDP of a country
as a control variable for its overall economic development. Furthermore, we insert
Huber’s index of constitutional structures to control for the constraining effect of na-
tional veto players on cross-sectional convergence. It is commonly understood that a
higher number of domestic veto players hampers radical changes and thus, constrains
governments from big shifts in PLMP efforts (Starke 2006, Person 1996). According
to power resource approaches, similar socio-economic challenges do not necessarily
lead to convergence, since political mediation and the distribution of power act as an
intervening variable (Korpi 2003). In addition, left parties are argued to differ signif-
icantly from other parties in their preferences for labour market policies in general
2But see Copeland and ter Haar (forthcoming).
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and for benefit levels in particular (Allan and Scruggs, 2004). To control for the role
of domestic politics on changes in LMPs, we deploy the percentage of total cabinet
posts held by leftist parties from the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al.
2008). Following Plu¨mper and Schneider (2009), our study aims to estimate rather
than to measure convergence by using pooled time-series cross-section regression
analyses. Estimating rather than measuring convergence holds many advantages, for
instance it gives the researcher the possibility to check for conditional convergence, to
account for interaction effects and to test hypotheses (Plu¨mper and Schneider 2009).
3.4 Method
The model of choice in our analysis is the error correction model (ECM), allow-
ing us to test for short- as well as long-term effects of the explanatory variables
on changes in the dependent variable simultaneously (Busemeyer 2009, Iversen and
Cusack 2000). This is achieved by including both the level and first difference of
all time-variant explanatory variables. Being more precisely, the level of a respec-
tive variable captures its long-term response, while the first difference measures the
short-term response to a change of this variable. Virtually time-constant variables
like constitutional veto points or the variables displaying EES-influence are entered
in levels only. As the error correction model is useful for stationary and integrated
data alike, it is suited to overcome problems of unit roots (De Boef and Keele 2008,
Beck 1991). Furthermore, models relying exclusively on level variables are said to
be prone to high levels of autocorrelation, whereas error correction models proved
to tone down this effect (Podesta` 2006). Since an ECM involves that the dependent
as well as a number of the independent variables are measured as first differences,
our model accounts for problems of stationarity and autocorrelation, two issues that
often make time series cross-section regression difficult (Kittel and Winner 2005).
Potentially remaining autocorrelation is addressed by estimating the models with an
AR(1) disturbance term. In order to correct for panel heteroscedasticity and contem-
poraneous spatial correlation, we use panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz
1995). Formally we can express our baseline model as follows:
∆yit = α+βyit−1+∑γ jXit−1+∑δ j∆Xit +θyit−1zit +µzit +ωt + εit (1)
where ∆yit stands for the change of the dependent variable in country i from one pe-
riod to the next. The lagged variable yit−1 is the convergence indicator and yit−1zit
reflects the interaction term indicating whether the rate of convergence depends on
constraint z (i.e. on EES participation). If β = 0 and θ 6= 0, then the speed of con-
vergence entirely depends on the constraint z. If β ,θ 6= 0, the convergence is caused
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partly by EES and partly by some other unobserved factors. If, finally, β 6= 0 and
θ = 0, participation in EES has no significant effect on the convergence of PLMPs.
X stands for a vector of the independent variables discussed above, α is the intercept
and ε the error term. ∆Xit represents short-term effects of changes in explanatory
variables and are captured by δ . Long-term effects of the levels (Xit−1) are calculated
by γ j/β . Finally, time effects ωt are included capturing common trends and external
shocks all countries are jointly exposed to.
Since the inclusion of both a lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects
renders the estimator inconsistent (Nickell 1991), fixed effects are not included in
the model. Furthermore, since the ECM involves first differencing and removes the
unit specific effects, fixed effects are not required to receive consistent estimations
(Wooldridge 2002). This enables us to include (virtually) time-invariant variables
without causing wrong inferences, a problem empirical researchers are frequently
faced with when using fixed effects (Baltagi 2001). However, including country dum-
mies to our model we received similar results.3
Passive labour market policies in general as well as replacement rates in particular
are said to change quite slowly over time, making it sometimes difficult to detect
changes on annual basis. Therefore, as an additional step in our empirical analysis, 3-
year averages are used to make changes in our social indicators more pronounced and
hence, easier to detect potential effects. What is more, this procedure helps us to relax
assumptions about the adequate lag length of the explanatory variables, a potential
issue when political data is used (Van Vliet and Koster 2011, Armingeon 2007). With
regard to political variables like the EES or Council recommendations, it is unlikely
that their influence on PLMPs necessarily occurs with a one year time lag. It seems
more plausible that the influence of the EES takes a longer period until its influence
on PLMPs materializes. Using period data accounts for this sluggishness and is quite
common in welfare state analysis, either as a check of robustness (Armingeon 2007)
or as a genuine approach in itself, best known through the SCIP dataset (Korpi 2003).
The study includes 22 OECD countries. This group consists of 15 EU countries -
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom and 7
non-EU countries, namely Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzer-
land and the United States. The group of non-EU countries is included to control for
any international trend of reprioritization of labour market policies other than Eu-
ropeanization. The period included runs from 1985 to 2009, which enables us to
compare the period before the introduction of the EES in 1997 with the period after
its introduction.4
3Results are available upon request.
4The OECD Social Expenditure Database contains data until 2007 and projections for the later years.
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4 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents measures of the generosity of passive labour market policies in 22
OECD countries. Between 1985 and 2009, the average level of expenditures on
PLMPs as a percentage of GDP has remained fairly unchanged across the EU and
the other OECD countries. In 2009, the EU-15 countries spent on average 1.4 per-
cent of GDP on PLMPs against 0.7 percent in the non-EU countries. Relative to the
expenditures on activation policies, PLMP expenditures have on average decreased
across the EU-15 countries, but they have increased across the OECD-7 countries.
The average PLMP expenditures per unemployed and the average net unemployment
replacement rates have decreased as well across the 22 OECD countries. Indeed,
PLMP expenditures and replacement rates have decreased in the majority of the coun-
tries. Interestingly, both at the beginning and at the end of the period unemployment
benefit schemes were more generous in the EU-countries than in the non-EU coun-
tries. Furthermore, there is considerable variation in the PLMPs across the countries.
In Luxembourg, an unemployed average production worker received a benefit of 83.5
percent of the last earned income in 2009, while in the United Kingdom this was 17.3
percent.
The dispersion measures indicate that PLMP expenditures as a percentage of
GDP have converged across all 22 OECD countries. Relatively to ALMP expen-
ditures, PLMP expenditures have converged across the EU-15 countries, but they
have diverged across the OECD-7 countries. The same is true with regard to unem-
ployment replacement rates, where the EU-15 countries have converged again over
the whole time span, whereas the OECD-7 countries show signs of divergence. The
same holds for PLMP expenditure per unemployed, which indicates a trend of con-
vergence for the EU-15 countries but no change in the dispersion across the OECD-7
countries . However, for the last two policy measures the changes in the coefficient
of variation are rather small. This indicates that the more substantial changes in the
standard deviation are mainly driven by the changes in the mean levels.
With respect to the third hypothesis, Figure 1 displays the relationship between
the overall number of Council recommendations a country received and its mean
annual change in PLMP expenditure per unemployed after the launch of the EES in
1998. The total number of recommendations calling for PLMP reform ranges from
zero for Ireland and Portugal to a maximum of six recommendations received by
Germany, reflecting the varying degree of exposure in terms of EES targeting. Taking
a closer look, the scatter plot suggests that especially the Continental but also the
Nordic welfare states have been subject of policy recommendations regarding passive
labour market schemes. This seems rather counterintuitive, as the Nordic countries
are usually considered as the best pupils of the class when it comes to welfare state
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matters. However, because the PLMPs are fairly generous in Continental and Nordic
countries, they contain relatively strong disincentives for work. Therefore, Sweden,
for instance, has been recommended to review tax and benefit systems to improve job
incentives (see also Jacobsson 2005).5 What is more, Figure 1 shows a fair amount of
variation in growth of PLMP spending per unemployed, with the Southern countries
having the biggest increases during the period of examination. The average annual
growth rate for the group of Southern countries (IT, GRE, PRT, SP) sums up to 3.5
In summary, the descriptive statistics indicate that the expenditures on PLMPs
have decreased and that unemployment benefits have become less generous. These
changes are in line with the guidelines of the EES which state that the disincentives
of benefit schemes should be reduced in order to promote employment and to reduce
unemployment. The shift in financial resources from passive to active policies is also
in line with the guidelines of the EES. Furthermore, the generosity levels of PLMPs
seem to have converged, which is in line with the expected impact of the EES as well.
However, based on the descriptive statistics, it is not clear whether the convergence
trend is significantly stronger across the EU-15 than across the 22 OECD countries.
Regression analyses should shed more light on this question.
5In contrast, Southern countries receive less recommendations on PLMPs, as they have less generous
PLMPs, but they receive more recommendations regarding activation policies than Nordic countries.
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5 Regression results
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 2. First and foremost, in all mod-
els the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable (LDV) is negative and shows high
significance for all four labour market policy indicators. This result indicates that
convergence in passive labour market policies is a phenomenon observable across the
board of the industrialized world. What is more, the results suggest that convergence
is fostered by EES participation. The interaction terms between EES membership
and the LDVs show mostly negative signs. As laid out in our second hypothesis, this
indicates that countries participating in the EES converge faster than non-participants.
This can be illustrated in the model of PLMP expenditure as a percentage of GDP,
where the effect of the LDV changes from -0.051 for non-participating countries to
-0.124 for EES countries.6 Looking at 3-year averaged data, we obtain similar but
more pronounced results with a greater statistical significance of the interaction term.
As 3-year averages make changes in the dependent variable more pronounced, the
EES bolsters the speed of convergence significantly in the models of PLMP as a per-
centage of GDP, PLMP relative to ALMP and PLMP per unemployed. Only in the
case of unemployment replacement rates as the indicator of interest, a significant ef-
fect of EES on the speed of convergence cannot be found. Overall, the results are in
line with our second hypothesis that EES bolstered the convergence of passive labour
market policy schemes.
Testing for our first hypothesis, results are less intuitive as expected. Countries
subject to EES tend to increase spending on PLMPs more than their non-EES coun-
terparts, even though results in some cases miss the level of significance.7 This brings
doubts about the constraining effect of the EES on passive labour market policies.
However, this result seems partly driven by the Southern EU member states which
experienced substantial growth of public expenditure in general (see Starke et al.
2008) and strong increases of PLMP expenditure in particular at that period of time
(see Appendix Figure A1). On average, this catching up development potentially
dominates the constraining effect stemming from the EES. To test this assumption,
we ran auxiliary regressions and changed our overall EES dummy to one compris-
ing only the Northern member states (EU-15 minus Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain).
This time, the EES-North dummy has the expected negative sign for all four of our
indicators and is significant in most cases, which gives further evidence for a dis-
tinct development in PLMP efforts among the Southern countries (see table A1 of
the Appendix). These results point to the comprehensive nature of the EES, pursuing
different objectives in regard to changes of labour market policies among its member
6The effect of EES participation is given by -0.051 + (-0.073) =-0.124.
7This result holds also for excluding the interaction term (not reported).
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states. Aiming to filter the differentiated effect the EES had on single member states,
this result leads us directly to the application of an even more fine-grained measure of
EES’ influence, namely using individual country specific recommendations regard-
ing PLMP reform. This approach takes into account the different levels of exposure
to EES recommendations countries experienced. As already highlighted in the de-
scriptive section, some countries received a fairly high number of recommendations
concerning passive labour market reforms, whereas others did not receive any advice.
According to Tucker (2003), the bare number of recommendations does matter in in-
fluencing member states policy reforms. Hence, to test for our third hypothesis, we
disaggregate the EES influence into Council recommendations on PLMP reform.
Table 3 presents results obtained from our analysis focussing on variation within
the EU. Again, convergence can be observed across all countries and measures for the
dependent variable. In all models, the variable indicating Council recommendations
has a negative sign although the effects do not reach significance in all cases. Nev-
ertheless, given the low statistical power, effects close to conventional significance
levels can be considered meaningful. It gives weak support to the expectation that
the Council is able to influence LMP reforms through its policy recommendations.
Especially looking at the averaged data brings some evidence to this third hypothesis,
revealing a negative covariation between the number of Council recommendations
and changes in passive labour market policies. It should be noted that the use of
Council recommendations may potentially identify reversed causality, with countries
having lower levels of PLMP efforts receiving lesser recommendations. However,
this reversed effect could perhaps be expected with variables measured in levels, but
it is less likely when looking at period changes. Therefore, the use of first differences
of the dependent variables diminishes this potentially distorting effect. Moreover,
since the inclusion of a LDV on the right-hand side controls for the differences in
levels, our model predicts the effect of an additional recommendation when levels
are hold constant (= ceteris paribus condition ).
Interestingly, in comparison to annual data the results obtained from 3-year peri-
ods mostly indicate significant effects of the EES variable, its interaction term and the
Council recommendations, respectively. This underpins our reasoning for using aver-
aged data as it takes into account that new policies may need time to be implemented.
Nevertheless, overall results are at times mixed and of feeble magnitude, indicating
at most a weak systematic relationship between the EES and domestic reforms of
passive labour market policies.
A brief look at the control variables shows that most variables have the ex-
pected signs. For instance, a change in the unemployment rate has a positive sig-
nificant effect on both PLMP spending as a percentage of GDP and PLMP relative to
ALMP spending. This is what one would expect, since higher unemployment rates
17
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are almost immediately transmitted into higher spending for unemployment bene-
fits through the automatic stabilizers. On the contrary, a change in unemployment
has a robust negative impact on PLMP expenditures per unemployed. Given that a
higher number of unemployed people immediately increases the denominator of this
specific indicator, this result is no surprise. What is more, hikes in the unemploy-
ment rate as well as persistently high levels of joblessness seem to put pressure on
the generosity of unemployment replacement rates. As expected, real GDP growth is
negatively associated with most of our labour market indicators, reflecting changes in
the denominator. Running against our expectations the number of constitutional veto
points is positively associated in most of our models, but the level of significance is
low. For the other control variables, the estimations show no clear results.
6 Conclusion
Convergence of national labour market policies is an important goal of the EES.
Existing studies on the effect of the EES have been mainly focused on activation
policies, while less attention has been paid to PLMPs. With respect to PLMPs, the
underlying goal of the EES is to reduce work disincentives. In our analysis, we
showed that affluent democracies became more similar with regard to PLMP efforts,
with the EES fostering this trend even further. Moreover, we examined to what extent
the findings on the relationship between the EES and reforms of PLMPs presented in
the case study literature can be generalized to a larger sample of countries. The results
suggest that via Council recommendations the EES has contributed to reforms which
resulted in lower expenditures on passive labour market policies. In line with this
finding, analyses of replacement rates suggest that unemployment benefit schemes
have become less generous. However, we have to acknowledge the individualized
effect of the EES on single member states, mirrored by the rejection of our hypothesis
claiming a negative effect of the EES as a whole. The pressure to domestic policy
reforms stemming from the EES varies across countries and time.
With regard to the Council recommendations, our results suggest that there is a
negative covariation between the number of Council recommendations and spending
on passive labour market policy measures, especially when 3-years averaged data
are used. This relationship is visible in both descriptive illustrations as well as in
the overall negative effect of Council recommendations in our empirical analysis.
Hence, these findings tend to support the argument that Council recommendations
create pressure on governments to reform domestic PLMPs (Tucker 2003, Heiden-
reich and Bischoff 2008). Interestingly, this result is not in line with the results of
Van Vliet and Koster (2011) which indicate that Council recommendations do not
contribute to domestic policy reforms in the case of activation policies. A tentative
19
explanation for the different results might be related to the differences in the type
of domestic policy reforms. Reductions in the generosity of unemployment benefit
schemes are less popular reforms than expanding activation programmes (Vis 2009).
Therefore, domestic politicians use Council recommendations more for justifying
cuts in unemployment benefits than for increasing public expenditures on activation
schemes (Bu¨chs 2007). As a result, recommendations are more relevant for PLMP
reforms than for ALMP reforms.
Finally, the results indicate that the converging trend of public expenditure and
unemployment benefits has progressed further across advanced industrialized coun-
tries and time. These findings are in line with earlier studies (Caminada et al. 2010;
Starke et al. 2008). It is striking that convergence also materializes in the realm of un-
employment replacement rates when controlled for a wide range of effects, rejecting
the idea of on-going divergence and path dependency put forward by some authors
(e.g. Montanari 2008, Korpi 2003). Although this study includes the first years of
the credit crisis at the beginning of the 21st century, it is future research that should
denote whether the crisis has triggered different policy responses by governments, or
whether the trend of convergence continues.
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Appendix
A Growth of PLMP expenditure per unemployed in South-
ern member states
Figure A. 1: PLMP expenditure per unemployed in Southern member states, 1998-
2009.
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B EU-Council recommendations listed by country and year
Austria (1 recommendation in total)
2002
”Austria should therefore develop policies to ensure an adequate labour supply in
the future. In this context, Austria should pursue and extend the reform of tax and
benefit systems to increase the participation of older workers and low skilled and low
paid workers [...].”
Belgium (5 recommendations in total)
2000
”Belgium should therefore examine in more detail disincentives within the tax and
benefit system which may discourage labour market participation, particularly of
women and older workers.”
2001
”Belgium should therefore continue examine disincentives within the tax and benefit
system which may discourage labour market participation, particularly those affect-
ing older workers”
2002
”Belgium should, in particular, examine the impact of recent measures and consider
further measures aimed at preventing the early withdrawal of workers from work, as
well as incentives enhancing the capacity of older workers to remain at work;”
2003
”Making work pay: Belgium should therefore implement the planned multiannual
reduction of the tax and non-tax burden on labour so as to encourage employees to
take up work and employers to create new jobs, in combination with a further review
of the benefit system in order to remove unemployment traps;”
2004
”[...]Belgium should give immediate priority to review tax and benefit systems to
remove subsisting unemployment traps and provide adequate incentives for active
job search by reviewing the conditionality of benefits,”
Denmark (3 recommendations in total)
2000
”Denmark should pursue reforms of the tax and benefit system so as to reduce the
overall fiscal pressure on labour, in particular the tax burden on low incomes, and to
increase incentives to take up or remain in jobs.”
2001
”Denmark should therefore increase incentives to take up, or remain in, employment
and continue to monitor closely reform of early retirement and leave schemes in the
light of the need to increase labour supply;”
28
2004
”Denmark should give immediate priority to review tax and benefit systems to reduce
marginal tax rates and raise incentives for low-income groups to work, including the
unemployed and the inactive,”
Finland (3 recommendations in total)
2001
”Finland should therefore continue to review existing tax and benefit schemes, in
order to increase incentives to work and to recruit workers,[...]”
2002
”Finland should therefore continue to review tax and benefit schemes with a view
to encouraging participation in the labour market and ensuring the availability of
labour;[...] and to improve incentives in benefit schemes, especially pensions, for
people to take up work and to stay in the labour force;”
2004
”Finland should give immediate priority to further reform tax and benefit systems to
remove unemployment traps;”
France (1 recommendation in total)
2002
”France should therefore building on recent tax-benefit reforms, continue im-
plementing and monitoring the impact of policy measures designed to encour-
age workers to seek and remain in work,[...]”
Germany (6 recommendations in total)
2000
”Germany should examine in more detail disincentives within the tax and ben-
efit system which may discourage labour-market participation of all groups,
especially of older workers.”
2001
”Germany should therefore continue to examine obstacles and disincentives
liable to discourage labour market participation amongst all groups, espe-
cially older workers.”
2002
”Germany should therefore continue to remove obstacles and disincentives
liable to discourage labour market participation amongst older workers and
other groups at risk;[...]”
”Germany should therefore pursue efforts to reduce taxes and social security
contributions at the lowest end of the wage scale to make work pay and to
enhance viable and acceptable employment prospects; examine and report
on the impact of measures undertaken;”
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2003
”Making work pay: Germany should therefore continue the reform of the tax
and social benefit system, thereby ensuring sufficient incentives to take up
work. At the same time, enforce the legal obligation of active job search as a
condition for receipt of benefits.”
2004
”Germany should give immediate priority to continue reform of the tax and
social benefit system, thereby ensuring sufficient incentives to take up work;[...]”
Greece (1 recommendation in total)
2000
”Greece should examine in more detail disincentives within the tax and bene-
fit system which may discourage labour market participation, in particular of
women,[...]”
Italy (3 recommendations in total)
2000
”Italy should continue the implementation of the reform of pension and other
benefit systems in order to reduce the outflow from the labour market into
pensions and other schemes;[...]”
2001
”Italy should therefore continue the implementation of the reform of pension
through the review planned for 2001 and review other benefit systems in order
to reduce the outflow from the labour market[...]”
2002
”Italy should therefore continue to increase labour market flexibility with a
view to better combining security with greater adaptability to facilitate ac-
cess to employment; pursue the implementation of the reform of the pensions
system through the review planned for 2001, and undertake the planned re-
view of other benefit systems in order to reduce the outflow from the labour
market;[...]”
Luxembourg (2 recommendations in total)
2000
”Luxembourg should examine in more detail the tax-benefit system with a
view to removing disincentives which may discourage the participation in em-
ployment, in particular of older workers;[...]”
2001
”Luxembourg should therefore pursue efforts and implement measures aimed
at increasing labour-market participation rates amongst older workers and
women, including a review of tax and benefit systems;[...]”
30
Netherlands (4 recommendations in total)
2000
”The Netherlands should continue efforts to improve the tax-benefit system
with a view to removing disincentives which may discourage participation in
employment, in particular of women and older workers. Resolute efforts are
needed to reduce the high number of persons who remain outside the labour
market supported by passive income support schemes;”
2001
”The Netherlands should therefore continue to cooperate with the social part-
ners, to reduce disincentives in the benefit system liable to discourage people
from participating in the open labour market,[...]”
2002
”The Netherlands should therefore in order to tap all possibilities of poten-
tial labour supply and reduce inactivity, address the cumulation of benefits,
including local cost of living subsidies for low income recipients.[...]”
2003
”Making work pay: The Netherlands should therefore improve the trans-
parency of the benefit system by an increased use of tax-based measures
instead of subsidies and by a better coordination of national and local in-
come support. Ensure that the disability scheme addresses both the need to
contain the inflow into the scheme and to activate those who already receive
benefits.[...]”
Spain (1 recommendation in total)
2001
”Spain should therefore examine the incentives/disincentives emerging from
the tax and benefit systems with a view to increase participation in the labour
market and stable employment.”
Sweden (3 recommendations in total)
2002
”Sweden should therefore pursue reforms, including the setting of targets tak-
ing into account the national situation, to reduce the tax burden on labour in
particular for low wage earners; pursue further the reforms of tax and benefit
systems to promote work incentives;”
2003
”Making work pay: Sweden should therefore pursue the reforms of tax and
benefit systems to improve work incentives, in particular for those groups for
which the interplay between taxes and benefits has the most negative impact
upon labour supply,[...]”
2004
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”In view of the ageing population, there will be a need to sustain labour
supply by exploiting potential sources of labour among immigrants, the young
and the long-term sick, and by improving incentives to work.”
United Kingdom (1 recommendation in total)
2004
”The United Kingdom should give immediate priority to ensure that active
labour market policies and benefit systems prevent de-skilling and promote
quality in work, by improving incentives to work and supporting the sustain-
able integration and progress in the labour market of inactive and unemployed
people;[...]”
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